Substantially the same language was in a resolution passed in 1777 by the Continental Congress, and it reappeared in the Articles of Confederation. The first Congress under the Constitution passed an act (May 26, 1790) to effectuate this clause by prescribing how records should be authenticated and declaring that they should have' such faith and credit in every State as they had in the State from which they were taken.  

Full faith and credit was held by the Supreme Court of the United States (1903) not to have been denied by the courts of Massachusetts in permitting the first wife of a man, rather than the second, to administer his estate upon his death, as the law of Massachusetts made invalid in that State a divorce which he went to South Dakota to procure. Full faith and credit did not require that a decree of divorce granted in South Dakota should be respected and made operative against the public policy of Massachusetts.  

"The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse among the people of the different States in this Union," ran the Articles of Confederation, "the free inhabitants of each of these States (paupers, vagabonds and fugitives from justice excepted) shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several States."  

A citizen of one State going to or transacting business in another is entitled in the latter State to the privileges and immunities enjoyed by its citizens. The State cannot legislate against him or otherwise disfavor him. The intent was that the citizen of one State should not be an alien in another. In any State he has the protection of the government of that State, the enjoyment of life and liberty with the right to acquire and possess property, the right to pursue and obtain happiness, to institute actions in court, and generally to possess what the citizen of the State possesses. Numerous cases have arisen under this clause where States have attempted to favor their own citizens to the prejudice of the citizens of other States. Such laws are void for conflict with this clause.  

After the Negro was emancipated there was adopted the Fourteenth Amendment (1868), one of the provisions of which172 is that "no State shall . . . abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States." Thus, putting the two clauses together, the State is forbidden to abridge the privileges and immunities of (1) the citizen of another State, and of (2) the citizen of the United States. For there are two citizenships and two loyalties.  

A State cannot take away the right of citizens of other States to sue in the Federal courts of that State. This clause was held not to warrant an act of Congress prescribing punishment of persons for conspiring to deprive others (liberated Negroes) of equal privileges or immunities, as the guaranty of the Constitution is against wrongs done by States and not by persons. Wrongs done in a State by persons must be dealt with by the State in the exercise of its police power, and not by the Nation.  

The "shall . . . be delivered up" in this clause is not mandatory. Congress has provided no remedy should a State refuse to deliver, and there have been many instances of refusal where, in the opinion of the Governor, substantial justice did not require surrender. The Governor of Ohio refused (1860) to deliver to Kentucky a man charged with aiding the escape of a slave, and the Supreme Court of the United States held that the Act of Congress of 1793, passed under this clause, declaring it to be the duty of a State to deliver upon a sufficient showing, was not mandatory. Therefore, a Federal court would not issue a mandate to compel the governor to obey.  

The State will not deliver the fugitive until it has examined the record against the accused and found it regular and legal. If it appears that the proceeding was brought to force a settlement of a private demand, or to bring back the accused to be tried on some other charge, or otherwise to misuse legal writ or process, the application will be denied. And even after the State has determined to surrender the fugitive, he may secure, by the writ of habeas corpus, a hearing in court as to whether, on the record exhibited against him, he is legally restrained of his liberty.  

One who while a fugitive commits an offence against the laws of the asylum State must stand trial there before being surrendered, and if convicted must serve sentence. To be a fugitive within the meaning of this clause it is enough to have left the demanding State after having committed a crime. One who goes into another State and commits a crime and then returns home is a fugitive. To be "charged" with crime within the language of the clause so as to warrant extradition one must be accused by a person having knowledge of the offence and stating it under oath; or if he has been convicted in the demanding State, then a record of the trial must be submitted to the Governor of the asylum State.  

It is the duty of the Federal courts to see that this power be not extended to fields and exercised in classes of cases not clearly within the Constitution.  

The "felony or other crime" of this clause includes any indictable offence under the present laws of the demanding State -- that is, it is not limited to the offences known to the common law at the time the Constitution was adopted.  

The governor of the asylum State should not attempt to pass upon the guilt of the accused -- it is enough to determine that an extraditable offence has been regularly charged.  

The international rule of treaty, that a fugitive surrendered by a foreign country cannot, on being taken home, be tried for an offence not embraced in the demand, does not generally apply to interstate extraditions under this clause, although some of the States follow that rule.  

Where a criminal who had fled to another State was taken back forcibly without extradition papers, the Supreme Court of the United States held that the governor of the asylum State had no authority under the Constitution to demand his return, a fugitive having no right to asylum in any State.  

A person may be arrested and detained for a reasonable time by the asylum State in order that the other State may prepare papers and make a demand.  

In 1793 Congress effectuated this clause by "An Act Respecting Fugitives from Justice and Persons Escaping from the Service of Their Masters." In 1850, when the rumblings of the coming Civil War were rising, Congress passed another Fugitive Slave Law requiring, among many things "all good citizens" to "aid in the prompt and efficient execution of this law", and authorizing officers "to summon and call to their aid the bystanders." In a case arising in Wisconsin, in which a man was charged with aiding in the escape of a fugitive slave in violation of this Act, it was held (1858) by the Supreme Court that under this clause Congress had authority to enact the Fugitive Slave Law.  

"I say that the South has been injured in this respect," said Daniel Webster of Massachusetts in the Senate in 1850, "and has a right to complain; and the North has been too careless of what I think the Constitution peremptorily and emphatically enjoins upon her as a duty."  

Many northern States enacted laws to aid the fugitive slave. Although the Ordinance of the Congress under the Articles of Confederation creating the Northwest Territory -- reenacted by the first Congress (August 7, 1789) under the Constitution -- forbade slavery, it nevertheless provided for the return of fugitive slaves to their owners.  

For nearly four years (November 17, 1777, to March 1, 1781) the adoption of the Articles of Confederation was delayed by a dispute over the lands lying west of the original colonies. The grants from the crown had extended to the west indefinitely. They were intercepted at the Mississippi by claims to that valley based on French explorations. Thus Virginia claimed what afterward became West Virginia, Kentucky, and also the greater part of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, and part of northern Michigan, Wisconsin, and Minnesota. Jumping across eastern New York to Oswego and a line thence south, Massachusetts claimed western New York and what later became the lower half of Michigan and the lower half of Wisconsin. Connecticut claimed what is now the northern, part of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois. North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia extended to the Mississippi. Some of the landless States, notably Maryland, contended that as those lands had been wrested from English dominion by common endeavor and sacrifice, they should become the property of the Union and not go to the enrichment of a few States. They finally carried their point. New York, which claimed but little, and Virginia, with a vast area, led the way (1781) by ceding their lands, and the others followed. Immediately Maryland, which had blocked the way, ratified the Articles of Confederation and they went into operation as successor to the provisional government maintained by the Continental Congress. That Congress had promised by resolution the year before (October 10, 1780) that lands which might be ceded to the Union by the State would be "disposed of for the common benefit of the United States", and also that they would be "settled and formed into distinct republican States which shall become members of the Federal Union."  

Later (1803, by the Louisiana Purchase from Napoleon of France, the vast territory between the Mississippi and the Rocky Mountains was added by President Jefferson to the domain. In 1819 Florida was secured by President Monroe from Spain. Texas was admitted (1845) in the term of President Polk. The war with Mexico (1846-1847) was followed by the purchase from that country by President Polk of the region west of the Rocky Mountains for $15,000,000 in cash and the assumption by the United States of all debts owing from the Mexican Government to American citizens, not to exceed $3,500,000. In 1867 Alaska was purchased of Russia for $7,200,000 by President Johnson, and following the war with Spain (1898) Puerto Rico and the Philippines came under the dominion of the United States during the term of President McKinley.  

Usually the people of a Territory have adopted a constitution and submitted it to Congress for approval. When all conditions have been satisfactory Congress has passed an act admitting the Territory as a State. The admission of Utah was once denied because of local religious customs. Many conditions were imposed by Congress after the Civil War upon the right of returning States to representation in Congress, such as the repudiation of the debt of the Confederacy, and the permission of the Negro to vote.  

The territory of Vermont, the first State to be admitted into the Union (March 4, 1791), was claimed by both New York and New Hampshire; but as the claim was never maintained by either State, the admission of Vermont was not the erection of a new State "within the jurisdiction of any other State", prohibited by the foregoing clause.  

The joint resolution of Congress (March 1, 1845) "for annexing Texas to the United States" authorized the creation of "new States, of convenient size, not exceeding four in number, in addition to said State of Texas."  

This clause requires the Nation to protect the State from invasion by a foreign power, and also from domestic insurrection 57. like the Dorr Rebellion, in Rhode Island, when the President announced that should it be necessary he would support the older government.  

What is a republican form of government or whether one exists in a State is determinable by the political power (legislative) of the United States and not by the judicial This question arose out of the Dorr Rebellion (1842), when persons in the military service of the State broke into and searched the rooms of persons who were in insurrection. In an action for damages brought by persons whose rooms had been entered, the defendants justified on the ground that as officers of the State they were helping it defend itself from insurrection under the declaration by it of martial law. The plaintiff rejoined that the former State government "had been displaced and annulled by the people of Rhode Island" and that the persons who were said to be in insurrection and whose houses were broken into were in fact "engaged in supporting the lawful authority of the State." In a decision written by Chief Justice Taney in 1848 it was said that in forming the constitutions of the different States after the Declaration of Independence and in the various changes and alterations which had since been made, "the political department has always determined whether the proposed constitution or amendment was ratified or not by the people of the State, and the judicial power has followed its decision."  

In 1867 the State of Georgia filed a bill for injunction in the Supreme Court of the United States against Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of War, General Grant, and Major General Pope, to restrain them from carrying out the provisions of the Reconstruction Acts of Congress96 for maintaining order in the southern States and holding elections for the adoption of new constitutions. The bill for injunction recited that Major General Pope had been placed in command of the military district in which Georgia was situated for the purpose of carrying out these Acts of Congress, although at the close of the war military forces had been withdrawn and the civil government of the State had been revived and reorganized with the consent of the President as Commander in Chief of the army, all that was lacking for complete rehabilitation being representation in the Senate and the House of Representatives. The Supreme Court dismissed the bill for want of jurisdiction, saying that its authority related to "the rights of persons or property, not merely political rights, which do not belong to the jurisdiction of a court, either in law or equity."  

In 1912 a tax-payer in Oregon brought this question again to the attention of the Supreme Court, claiming that the amendment of 1902 to the constitution of Oregon, by which the people reserved to themselves the right to propose amendments to the Constitution and to enact or reject at the polls laws or amendments independent of the legislative assembly, had destroyed the republican form of government which had been guaranteed by this section of the National Constitution. It was contended that such government by the people directly is democracy and not the representative or republican form which the framers of the Constitution had in mind. The Supreme Court said that the questions presented "have long since by this court been definitely determined to be political and governmental and embraced within the scope of the powers conferred upon Congress, and not therefore within the reach of the judicial power."  

During Dorr's Rebellion in Rhode Island in 1842, when two rival organizations were claiming to be the legal government, Governor King of the. older government called upon President Tyler for assistance. The President said that he hoped that intervention might not be necessary for the restoration of order, but that he would "not be found to shrink from the performance of a duty which, while it would be the most painful, is at the same time the most imperative." As between the contending parties, he said that it would be his duty "to respect the requisition of that government which had been recognized as the existing government of the State through all time past until I shall be advised, in regular manner, that it has been altered and abolished and another substituted in its place by legal and peaceable proceedings." That declaration virtually ended the rebellion.  

In the Constitutional Convention there was much discussion and revision before this clause was finally so nicely balanced between National and State authority.